Original Arabic Text

Metre: mefâ‘îlün mefâ‘îlün fe‘ûlün (the vāfir metre of Arabic prosody; the name "serî‘" offered by the editors does not fit the syllable pattern of the lines).

القَولُ فِي حَقائِقِ الأشياءِ
el-Ḳavlu fī ḥaḳā’iḳı’l-eşyā’ (on the realities of things)

لِكُلِّ حَقائِقِ الأشياءِ ثُبُوتٌ
وَنَعْلَمُ بِالضَّرُورَةِ وَ ارْتِجالِ

Li-külli ḥaḳā’iḳı’l-eşyā’i s̱übūtun
Ve na‘lemu bi’ż-żarūreti ve’rticālī

وَخالَفَ فِيهِ سُوفَسْطاءُ جَهْلاً
أضاعُوا العُمْرَ فِي قَولٍ مُحالِ

Ve ḫālefe fīhi sūfesṭā’u cehlen
Eżā‘u’l-‘umra fī ḳavlin muḥālī

القَولُ فِي أسبابِ العِلْمِ
el-Ḳavlu fī esbābi’l-‘ilm (on the means of knowledge)

لِعِلْمِ الخَلْقِ أسبابٌ ثَلاثَة
سَأنْظِمُها بِنَظْمٍ كَاللَّآلِي

Li-‘ilmi’l-ḫalḳı esbābun s̱elās̱e
Se-enẓımuhā bi-naẓmin ke’l-le’ālī

حَواسٌ سَلِيمَةٌ، والعَقْلُ ثانٍ
وَقَولٌ صادِقٌ فَاسْمَعْ مَقالِي

Ḥavāssun selīmetun ve’l-‘aḳlu s̱ānin
Ve ḳavlun ṣādıḳun fe’sma‘ maḳālī

وَتَنْقَسِمُ الحَواسُ بِخَمْسِ حِسٍّ
سَأتْلُوها عَلَيكَ بِلا اعْتِلالِ

Ve tenḳasimu’l-ḥavāssu bi-ḫamsi ḥissin
Se-etlūhā ‘aleyke bi-lā’‘tilālī

فَسَمْعٌ ثُمَّ ذَوقٌ ثُمَّ لَمْسٌ
وَإبْصارٌ وَ شَمٌّ يا أهلَ خالِ

Fe-sem‘un s̱umme ẕevḳun s̱umme lemsun
Ve ibṣārun ve şemmun yā ehle ḫālī

وَقَولٌ صادِقٌ يَنْقَسِمُ أيضاً
عَلَى قِسْمَينِ يا أهْلَ الخِلالِ

Ve ḳavlun ṣādıḳun yenḳasimu eyżan
‘Alā ḳısmeyni yā ehle’l-ḫilālī

فَقِسْمٌ ما تَوافَرَ فِيهِ قَولٌ
مِنْ أقوامٍ كَثِيرٍ بِالتَّوالِي

Fe-ḳısmun mā tevāfere fīhi ḳavlun
Min aḳvāmin kes̱īrin bi’t-tevālī

فَهذا القِسْمُ يُوجِبُ فِيكَ عِلْماً
ضَرُورِيًّا عَدِيمَ الاخْتِلالِ

Fe-hāẕe’l-ḳısmu yūcibu fīke ‘ilmen
Żarūriyyen ‘adīme’l-iḫtilālī

كَعِلْمٍ ثابِتٍ بِوُجُودِ مِصرٍ
وَأسلافِ المُلُوكِ ذَوِي المَعالِي

Ke-‘ilmin s̱ābitin bi-vücūdi Mıṣrin
Ve eslāfi’l-mülūki ẕevi’l-me‘ālī

وَثانِي القِسْمِ أخبارُ الرَّسُولِ
صَدُوقِ القَولِ عِندَ اللهِ عالِي

Ve s̱ānī’l-ḳısmi aḫbāru’r-resūli
Ṣadūḳı’l-ḳavli ‘inde’llāhi ‘ālī

وَأيضًا ذاكَ يُوجِبُ فِيكَ عِلْمًا
بِاستِدْلالِ عَقْلٍ ذِي اجتِيالِ

Ve eyżan ẕāke yūcibu fīke ‘ilmen
Bi’stidlāli ‘aḳlin ẕī’ctiyālī

ولكِنْ فِي التَّيَقُّنِ مِثْلَ عِلْمٍ
ضَرُورِيٍّ عَدِيمِ الارْتِحالِ

Ve lākin fi’t-teyaḳḳuni mis̱le ‘ilmin
Żarūriyyin ‘adīmi’l-irtiḥālī

وَعِلْمٌ ثابِتٌ بِالعَقْلِ أيضًا
عَلَى ضَرْبَينِ يا زُمَرَ الأهالِي

Ve ‘ilmun s̱ābitun bi’l-‘aḳli eyżan
‘Alā żarbeyni yā zümera’l-ehālī

فَإنْ يَكُ بِالبَداهَةِ فَهُوَ عِلْمٌ
ضَرُورِيٌّ غَنِيٌّ عَنْ مِثالِ

Fe-in yekü bi’l-bedāheti fe-hüve ‘ilmun
Żarūriyyun ġaniyyun ‘an mis̱ālī

وَإنْ يَحْصُلْ بِاسْتِدلالِ عَقْلٍ
فَكَسْبِيٌّ بِلا قِيلٍ وَقالِ

Ve in yaḥṣul bi’stidlāli ‘aḳlin
Fe-kesbiyyun bi-lā ḳīlin ve ḳālī

وَما الالهامُ مِن أسبابِ عِلْمٍ
بِصِحَّةِ شَيءٍ عِندَ ذَوِي الكَمالِ

Ve me’l-ilhāmu min esbābi ‘ilmin
Bi-ṣıḥḥati şey’in ‘inde ẕevi’l-kemālī

القَولُ فِي حُدُوثِ العِلْمِ
el-Ḳavlu fī ḥudūs̱i’l-‘ilm (so printed; the origination of the world is meant)

وَيَحْدُثُ عالَمٌ بِجَمِيعِ جُزْءٍ
فَلا تَسْمَعْ أباطِيلَ المَقالِ

Ve yaḥdus̱u ‘ālemun bi-cemī‘i cüz’in
Fe-lā tesma‘ ebāṭīle’l-maḳālī

وَذا إنْ قامَ ذاتًا فَهُوَ عَينٌ
وَإلّا فَهُوَ عَرَضٌ ذُو زَوالِ

Ve ẕā in ḳāme ẕāten fe-hüve ‘aynun
Ve illā fe-hüve ‘arażun ẕū zevālī

وَعَينٌ إنْ تَرَكَّبَ فَهُوَ جِسْمٌ
وَإلّا فَهُوَ جُزْءٌ يا أهلَ حالِ

Ve ‘aynun in terekkebe fe-hüve cismun
Ve illā fe-hüve cüz’un yā ehle ḥālī

يُسَمَّى جَوهَراً فَرْداً وَلكِنْ
قَدْ أنْكَرَهُ الحَكِيمُ بِلا انْعِدالِ

Yüsemmā cevheren ferden ve lākin
Ḳad enkerahu’l-ḥakīmu bi-lā’n‘idālī

وَهَذا العَرَضُ لا يَبْقَى زَماناً
بِحالٍ وَلا يَقُومُ بِلا مُحالِ

Ve hāẕe’l-‘arażu lā yebḳā zemānen
Bi-ḥālin ve lā yeḳūmu bi-lā maḥālī

فَيَحْدُثُ فِي الجَواهِرِ وَالجُسُومِ
عَلَى نَهَجِ الحُلُولِ وَاحْتِلالِ

Fe-yaḥdus̱u fi’l-cevāhiri ve’l-cüsūmi
‘Alā nehci’l-ḥulūli ve’ḥtilālī

كَألْوانٍ وَأكْوانٍ وَطَعْمٍ
وَأصْنافِ الرَّوائِحِ يا ابنَ خالِ

Ke-elvānin ve ekvānin ve ṭa‘min
Ve eṣnāfi’r-revā’iḥı yā’bne ḫālī

In English

33. All the realities of things are fixed and real; we know this necessarily, at once and without reflection.

34. The Sophists opposed this out of ignorance and wasted their lives on an absurd claim.

35. Created beings have three means of knowledge; I shall string them in verse like pearls.

36. Sound senses, reason as the second, and truthful report; listen to what I say.

37. The senses divide into five; I shall recite them to you without fault.

38. Hearing, then taste, then touch, then sight and smell, O man of eminence. (A footnote in the edition glosses "ḫāl" as "eminence".)

39. Truthful report likewise falls into two parts, O people of good qualities. (Footnote: "ḫilāl" means good deeds.)

40. One part is a report that has come in abundance from many groups in unbroken succession. (The print reads "tevāfere", "came in abundance"; the subject is the mutawātir report.)

41. This part produces in you a necessary knowledge, free of any defect,

42. like the certain knowledge we have of the existence of Egypt and of the past kings of high achievement.

43. The second part is the reports of the Messenger, true in word and high in rank before God.

44. This too produces knowledge in you, gained through the reasoning of a discerning mind.

45. Yet in certainty it is like necessary knowledge, which never shifts.

46. Knowledge established by reason is also of two kinds, O assemblies of people.

47. If it arises immediately, it is necessary knowledge and needs no example.

48. If it is reached by the mind's reasoning, it is acquired knowledge, beyond idle talk.

49. In the view of the learned, inspiration is not among the means of knowing that something is true.

50. The world, with all its parts, has come into being in time; pay no heed to false talk.

51. If a thing subsists by itself it is a substance ("ayn"); otherwise it is a passing accident.

52. A substance, if composite, is a body; otherwise it is a part, O people of spiritual states.

53. This part is called the "single atom" (cevher-i ferd); but the philosopher has denied it, without, as he thinks, swerving from the path. (The edition translates "the sage … denied it". "Ḥakīm" here most likely means the philosophers; the second half of the line can be read two ways.)

54. This accident never endures for any length of time, nor does it subsist without a locus. (The print has "muḥāl"; the sense requires "maḥāl", loci.)

55. It arises in atoms and bodies by way of indwelling and settling in them,

56. like colours, states of being, tastes and the many kinds of smell, O my cousin.

Literary and Historical Commentary

The First Word against the Sophists

Before speaking of God, the science of creed must first secure the possibility of knowledge. Sa‘dī Çelebi opens this section with two couplets and settles the answer at once. The realities of things exist, and we know this necessarily and without reflection (irticâlen); the "sūfesṭā", the Sophists, who opposed it wasted their lives on an absurd claim. Nasafī's treatise likewise, as Yusuf Şevki Yavuz describes it in his encyclopaedia entry, begins by pointing out that the world has a real existence. In the poem the principle is reduced to a single verdict, and scorn takes the place of argument. "They wasted their lives" is a judgement more than a proof; as he said in the introduction, Sa‘dī chose short, firm sentences for the student to memorise.

The Three Ways of Knowing

The second part, of fifteen couplets, lists the means of knowledge: sound senses, reason and truthful report. The five senses are listed in one couplet, in the order the metre allows. Truthful report divides into two. The first is a report that comes without interruption from many groups; the theologians call it tawātur. In the print the word appears as "tevāfere" (came in abundance), but tawātur is meant. As an example of the knowledge it gives, the existence of Egypt and of past kings is cited: someone who has never seen Egypt does not doubt that it exists. The second is the report of the Messenger. Sa‘dī defines the knowledge it gives with care: it is reached through reasoning, yet in certainty it is as firm as necessary knowledge. Knowledge gained by reason also divides into two: self-evident knowledge that arises in the mind at once, and acquired knowledge reached by argument.

The last couplet of the section is a rejection: inspiration, according to the learned, is not among the means of knowing that something is true. This sentence is the boundary the madrasa drew against those who would make personal intuition the measure of religious knowledge. No reason is given; here too the brevity of Nasafī's text is left intact.

Atom, Accident and Body

The heading of this part is printed in the edition as "el-Ḳavlu fī ḥudūs̱i’l-‘ilm"; the content and its rendering in the translation ("On the Origination of the World") show that it should read "ḥudūs̱u’l-‘ālem", the world's having come into being. This part prepares the ground for the proof of God's existence. The world, with all its parts, has come into being in time; then existing things are classified. What stands by itself is a substance ("ayn"); what stands in something else is an accident ("araz"). A substance is a body if composite and a part if not, and this part is called the "cevher-i ferd", the indivisible atom. Accidents do not last two moments and cannot exist without a locus; colours, states, tastes and smells are among them.

In the fifty-third couplet the poem adds a note to this dry classification: "Ḳad enkerahu’l-ḥakīm", the ḥakīm has denied it, the indivisible atom. In the article's Turkish the word becomes "the sage". The same encyclopaedia entry records that Taftāzānī, in his commentary, did not find the proofs offered for the atom sufficient, yet praised the view because it served as a refutation of the philosophers. This also shows that the philosophers stood against the indivisible atom, which is why it seems more apt to take "ḥakīm" here as "the philosopher". Sa‘dī's single line is the sign of a madrasa teacher aware of this debate; the qualifier "bi-lā’n‘idāl" (without swerving), open to misunderstanding, allows the couplet to be read in two ways.

The forms of address in this section are carefully chosen: "yā ehle ḫāl" (O man of eminence), "yā zümera’l-ehālī" (O assemblies of people), "yā’bne ḫālī" (O my cousin, literally "son of my maternal uncle"). As the editors have noticed, Sa‘dī chooses general addresses of this kind over terms such as "Ahl al-Sunna". Some of them come in for the sake of the rhyme; even so, they give the poem the voice of a teacher talking to his student.

Bibliography

Academic studies

Online sources