Original Arabic Text

Metre: mefâ‘îlün mefâ‘îlün fe‘ûlün. The edition calls it serî‘; the lines fit this pattern of the vāfir metre.

القَولُ فِي أفعالِ العِبادِ
el-Ḳavlu fī ef‘āli’l-‘ibād (on the acts of servants)

وَيَخْلُقُ كُلَّ أفْعالٍ لِعَبْدٍ
هِدايَتُهُ مُهْتَدٍ وَضَلالَ ضالِ

Ve yaḫluḳu külle ef‘ālin li-‘abdin
Hidāyetühū muhtedin ve żalāle żāllī

إرادَتُهُ تَعُمُّ لِكُلِّ فِعْلٍ
كَما عَمَّ المَشِيَّةُ كُلَّ بالِ

İrādetuhū te‘ummu li-külli fi‘lin
Kemā ‘amme’l-meşiyyetu külle bālī

يُقَدِّرُهُ وَيَقْضِيهِ وَيَحْكُمْ
فَخُذْ هذا وَ وَدِّعْ كُلَّ قالِ

Yüḳaddiruhū ve yaḳżīhi ve yaḥkum
Fe-ḫuẕ hāẕā ve vedde‘ külle ḳālī

وَلا فِي خَلْقِ شَرِّ الفِعْلِ قُبْحٌ
وَلَيسَ القُبْحُ إلّا فِي اشْتِغالِ

Ve lā fī ḫalḳı şerri’l-fi‘li ḳubḥun
Ve leyse’l-ḳubḥu illā fi’ştiġālī

وَفِعْلٌ اخْتِيارِيٌّ لِعَبْدٍ
يُثابُ بِهِ وَيُؤْخَذُ بِالنَّكالِ

Ve fi‘lun iḫtiyāriyyun li-‘abdin
Yüs̱ābu bihī ve yu’ḫaẕu bi’n-nekālī

يُرِيدُ حِسانَ أفعالٍ وَيَرْضَى
وَيُرْفِدُ أهْلَهُ عِظَمَ النَّوالِ

Yürīdu ḥisāne ef‘ālin ve yarżā
Ve yurfidu ehlehū ‘iẓame’n-nevālī

يُرِيدُ الشَّرَّ لكِنْ لَيسَ يَرْضَى
وَيُدْخِلُ أهْلَهُ دارَ اشْتِعالِ

Yürīdu’ş-şerre lākin leyse yarżā
Ve yudḫılu ehlehū dāra’ştı‘ālī

القَولُ فِي استِطاعَةِ العَبْدِ
el-Ḳavlu fi’stiṭā‘ati’l-‘abd (on the capacity of the servant)

مَعَ الفِعْلِ استِطاعَةُ كُلِّ عَبدٍ
هُوَ المُخْتارُ عِندَ أولِي كَمالِ

Ma‘a’l-fi‘li’stiṭā‘atu külli ‘abdin
Hüve’l-muḫtāru ‘inde ülī kemālī

وَما هُوَ غيرَ قُدْرَةِ كُلِّ عَبْدٍ
عَلَى فِعْلٍ جَمِيلٍ أو فِعالِ

Ve mā hüve ġayra ḳudreti külli ‘abdin
‘Alā fi‘lin cemīlin ev fi‘ālī

بِإسْمِ الاستِطاعَةِ قَدْ تُسَمَّى
سَلامَةُ آلَةٍ قَبْلَ افْتِعالِ

Bi’smi’l-istiṭā‘ati ḳad tüsemmā
Selāmetu āletin ḳable’fti‘ālī

وَهذا كانَ عِلَّةُ كُلِّ فِعْلٍ
وَمُعْتَمَدًا لِتَكْلِيفِ الفَعالِ

Ve hāẕā kāne ‘illete külli fi‘lin
Ve mu‘temeden li-teklīfi’l-fe‘ālī

وَلا تَكْلِيفَ قَطُّ عَلَى عِبادٍ
بِما لَمْ يَقْدِرُوها بِامتِثالِ

Ve lā teklīfe ḳaṭṭu ‘alā ‘ibādin
Bi-mā lem yaḳdirūhā bi’mtis̱ālī

فَألَمٌ بَعْدَ ضَربٍ وَانْكِسارُ
الزُّجاجِ عَقِيبَ كَسْرٍ وَانفِلالِ

Fe-elemun ba‘de żarbin ve’nkisāru
Ez-zücāci ‘aḳībe kesrin ve’nfilālī

وَما يُشْبِهُهُما مِنْ غَيرِ ذلِكَ
بِخَلْقِ اللهِ يا زُمَرَ الخِلالِ

Ve mā yüşbihuhumā min ġayri ẕālike
Bi-ḫalḳı’llāhi yā zümera’l-ḫilālī

وَلا فِي خَلْقِهِ صُنْعٌ لِعَبْدٍ
وَمُثْبِتُهُ عَنِ الإنْصافِ خالِي

Ve lā fī ḫalḳıhī ṣun‘un li-‘abdin
Ve müs̱bituhū ‘ani’l-inṣāfi ḫālī

القَولُ فِي الأجَلِ
el-Ḳavlu fi’l-ecel (on the appointed term)

وَما المَقْتُولُ حِينَ القَتْلِ مَيتًا
بِلا أجَلٍ فَلا تَكُ فِي ضَلالِ

Ve me’l-maḳtūlu ḥīne’l-ḳatli meyten
Bi-lā ecelin fe-lā tekü fī żalālī

فَبِالأجَلِ المُصِيبِ يَمُوتُ كُلٌّ
وَإنْ ماتُوا بِيَومٍ فِي القِتالِ

Fe-bi’l-eceli’l-muṣībi yemūtu küllun
Ve in mātū bi-yevmin fi’l-ḳıtālī

وَقامَ المَوتُ بِالأمْواتِ حَقًّا
وَيَخْلُقُهُ المُهَيمِنُ ذُو الجَلالِ

Ve ḳāme’l-mevtu bi’l-emvāti ḥaḳḳan
Ve yaḫluḳuhu’l-müheyminu ẕü’l-celālī

وَما الأجَلُ المُقَدَّرُ ذا عِدادٍ
بَلَى هُوَ واحِدٌ عِنْدَ الأهالِي

Ve me’l-ecelu’l-muḳadderu ẕā ‘idādin
Belā hüve vāḥidun ‘inde’l-ehālī

القَولُ فِي أنَّ الحَرامَ رِزْقٌ
el-Ḳavlu fī enne’l-ḥarāme rizḳ (that the unlawful is also provision)

وَأنَّ السُّحْتَ رِزْقٌ مِثْلَ حِلٍّ
عَلَيهِ أجْمَعُوا زُمَرَ المَوالِ

Ve enne’s-suḥte rizḳun mis̱le ḥıllin
‘Aleyhi ecme‘ū zümera’l-mevālī

ألا يا نَفْسُ تَسْتَوفِي وَتَأكُلْ
نَصِيبَكِ مِنْ حَرامٍ أو حَلالِ

Elā yā nefsu testevfī ve te’kul
Naṣībeki min ḥarāmin ev ḥalālī

وَلَمْ تَأكُلْ نَصِيبَ الغَيرِ قَطْعًا
وَلَمْ يَمْسَسْ نَصِيبَكِ مِنْ زَوالِ

Ve lem te’kul naṣībe’l-ġayri ḳaṭ‘an
Ve lem yemses naṣībeki min zevālī

فَما ذا الحِرْصُ يَومًا بَعْدَ يَومٍ
وَما ذا الحِقْدُ حالًا بَعْدَ حالِ

Fe-mā ẕe’l-ḥırṣu yevmen ba‘de yevmin
Ve mā ẕe’l-ḥıḳdu ḥālen ba‘de ḥālī

يُضِلُّ اللهُ أبَداً مَنْ يَشاءُ
وَيَهْدِي مَنْ يَشاءُ بِلا اعْتِمالِ

Yüżıllu’llāhu ebeden men yeşā’u
Ve yehdī men yeşā’u bi-lā’‘timālī

وَلَيسَ بِواجِبٍ إصلاحُ عَبْدٍ
عَلَى الرَّحْمَنِ فَاحْذَرْ عَنْ جِدالِ

Ve leyse bi-vācibin iṣlāḥu ‘abdin
‘Ale’r-raḥmāni fe’ḥẕer ‘an cidālī

In English

90. He creates all the acts of the servant: the guidance of the one who is guided and the error of the one who strays.

91. His will extends to every act, just as His volition covers everything that crosses the mind. (Footnote: "every act".)

92. He measures it out, decrees it and judges it; take this and bid farewell to every enemy of the truth. (Footnote: "ḳālī", one who hates the truth.)

93. There is no ugliness in the creating of an evil act; ugliness lies only in engaging in it.

94. The servant has acts of free choice, for which he is rewarded or taken to punishment.

95. God wills good deeds and is pleased with them, and He grants those who do them the greatest of gifts.

96. He wills evil too, but is not pleased with it, and He brings those who do it into the abode of flame. (Footnote: hell.)

97. Every servant's capacity to act exists together with the act; that is the chosen view among the learned.

98. It is nothing other than the servant's power to do a good deed or a foul one.

99. The soundness of the limbs and instruments before the act may also be called by the name of capacity;

100. and this is the cause of every act and the basis of being charged with good deeds. (Footnote: "fe‘āl", a good deed.)

101. Servants are never charged with what they have no power to carry out.

102. The pain that follows a blow, the breaking of glass after it is struck and chipped,

103. and other things like these come about by God's creating, O company of friends. (Footnote: "ḫilāl", friends.)

104. The servant has no part in creating them; whoever claims otherwise is devoid of fairness.

105. The slain man, at the moment of his killing, has not died without his appointed term; do not fall into error.

106. Everyone dies by the term that strikes him, even if he dies on a day of battle.

107. Death truly subsists in the dead, and the Guardian, Lord of majesty, creates it.

108. The appointed term is not many; according to the learned it is one.

109. Unlawful gain is provision just as lawful gain is; the company of friends has agreed on this.

110. Know, O soul, that you take and eat your portion in full, whether unlawful or lawful.

111. You have never eaten another's portion, and no loss has touched yours.

112. What, then, is this greed, day after day, and this rancour, from one state to the next?

113. God leads astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills, without effort.

114. It is not incumbent on the Merciful to do what is best for the servant; keep away from dispute.

Literary and Historical Commentary

An Aside Addressed to the Soul

In the hundred and tenth couplet the voice of the poem changes suddenly. The teacher who has been giving definitions turns to his own soul with "Elā yā nefsu": you take and eat your portion in full, whether unlawful or lawful; you have never eaten another's portion, and no one has touched yours; so what lies behind this greed growing day by day, this rancour passing from one state to the next, he asks. The rule that unlawful gain is also provision stops being a dry theological ruling and becomes a piece of counsel. If provision is measured out in advance, there is no sense in racing for it or envying others. The rest of the section proceeds by definitions; these three couplets are where the poem comes closest to the language of the sermon, and they anticipate the "O soul" address of the conclusion.

The Servant's Act and God's Creating

Twenty-five couplets treat one of the most debated questions of kalām under four headings: the acts of servants, the servant's capacity (istiṭā‘a), the appointed term, and provision. The core of the first part is gathered in two sentences. God creates all the acts of the servant; guidance and error alike come about by His creating. Yet the servant also has acts of his own choice, and reward and punishment are tied to these. As Ünlüsoy and Asım report, for Sa‘dī "there is no ugliness in the creating of evil; the ugliness lies only in engaging in it". That is, the creating of evil is not ugly; the ugliness is in doing it. God wills both good and evil, but He is pleased only with the good. This distinction between will and good pleasure is the way to leave responsibility with the servant while keeping God's all-embracing will intact.

The part on capacity rebuilds this balance through the servant's power. The servant's capacity exists together with the act and is not a power that exists before it; yet the soundness of limbs and instruments before the act may also be called capacity, and moral obligation rests on this second sense. Therefore no one is charged with what is beyond his power. The example that follows is of the kind the books of kalām favour: the pain felt by a man who is struck and the cracking of broken glass come about by God's creating, and the servant has no part in it. The servant strikes and the glass breaks; but it is not the servant who creates what follows from the blow. The poem counts anyone who claims otherwise as "devoid of fairness".

The Appointed Term, Provision and "the Best"

The part on the appointed term settles in a single ruling whether the slain man died before his term: everyone dies by the term that strikes him, even if he dies in battle. The term is one and not many. The part on provision states that the unlawful is also provision and deepens it with the counsel mentioned above. The hundred and fourteenth couplet gives the final ruling: it is not incumbent on the Merciful to bring the servant to what is best for him. The Turkish translation speaks here of "creating the best (aslaḥ)"; the word in the Arabic line is "iṣlāḥ", and the same debate is meant. Sa‘dī ends this topic too with "fe’ḥẕer ‘an cidāl", keep away from dispute. The same advice was given where the attribute of will was described. That Sa‘dī often turns to warnings of this kind to keep the reader from straying from moderation is also stressed in the study that accompanies the edition.

Bibliography

Online sources